Having posted recently about the terrible loss rates of the Starfighter, it is perhaps worth mentioning that they were apparently no worse than those of the EE Lightning. Of course more Starfighters crashed than Lightnings were actually built, but approaching a third of all RAF Lightnings did crash (nearly 90 machines). The problem is that no matter how professional any maintenance crew is, aircraft like the Lightning are/were inherently more subject to failures compared to other types because of their design. A look at the typical loss rates of the Lightnings or most other supersonic fighters designed in the '50s will show that even during their service lives, while being maintained by trained and experienced personnel with immediate access to spare parts and expense not an issue, failures did occur in relatively large numbers...
Back in 2009 one of three then airworthy EE Lightnings operated by Thunder City crashed at an airshow in South Africa killing experienced test pilot Dave Stock. I've spent the day reading the 136-page accident report which is quite horrific..http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/2009/8706.pdf
Of course we've had the Hunter Shoreham crash since then but this report rams or rammed home the potential dangers of operating such complex kit without the support infrastructure they had whilst in service with the military. Even in the 1960s fuel leaks were commonplace and a major potential fire hazard due to the inherent design of the machine. Engine bay fires frequently resulted in loss of flight controls, commonly heat failure of the v-jack controlling the elevator. Fires and Lightnings do not mix and SOP was to eject. Only in the Thunder City crash the ejection seat was long over-due maintenance and did not function.
Quoting from 'Lightning Boys';
"...Other exceptional modifications developed for the Lightning involved wrapping all hydraulic connections with fire proof tape, so that any spray leaks there (highly inflammable) would be turned into drip leaks (far less so). Procedures too evolved; eventually all hydraulic unions in hot areas were x-rayed after being squeezed into exactly the right shape. And, by 1982, no maintenance due point would be extended (a trivial practice on most aircraft types, within reason) without an internal inspection of engine compartments while the aircraft was restrained and run in double re-heat on the de-tuner. (The de-tuner was so-called because to call it a "silencer" would probably have infringed the Trade Descriptions Act.). Many times these inspections ended any thoughts of an extension of flying hours and the aircraft was brought smartly into the hangar for some urgent rectification.
In all, in engineering terms, operating the Lightning was a challenge. Working on it was difficult, and what was done had to be perfect because the aircraft could be very unforgiving..."
Graham Perry, former senior engineering officer 11 Sqn and later commander of the engineering wing at Binbrook
extract from "Tribute to a Legend from the Overberg" by James Clash
" ..I noticed an article about the air show in the Cape Town Times. A fighter jet developed problems with its hydraulics, and the pilot managed to steer away from the crowd and dump fuel. Then, after three attempts he said, “Ejection seat failure” and crashed in a fireball.
The pilot was Dave Stock and the aircraft was the Lightning I had flown in.
Writing this now, my thoughts shift from me to Stock and back. I can’t help wondering: Had the hydraulics failed a day earlier, on our flight (the last on which Stock took a commercial passenger), would I be alive?
I believe Stock thought he would be fine on his air-show flight, until the end. His aircraft had flown for a half-century without incident and was well-maintained at Thunder City. He methodically attacked the problem by using his air skills — first, to point the plane away from 40,000 spectators, and second, to dump fuel to reduce the size of a crash explosion. Finally, he planned to eject at the last minute. From his stated confidence in the equipment, he had no idea he was going to die until the seat failed....."
continued here
