Issue 4/75
" ..How many times have we all heard the statement "I'm only interested in " (fill in your own peculiar subject)? A quick look through any Air-Britain questionnaire brings to light members dedicated to a wide variety of highly-specialised subjects. Some even apologise for not having a highly-specialised interest!
In the field of aviation history, one salient fact emerges. As time goes by, few people keep to their original narrow subject to the exclusion of everything else. Someone with no interest in World War One aviation can become intrigued by the background to those far-off days. Usually such lack of interest is due to the general feeling that the Royal Flying Corps and its contemporaries were amateurish organisations flying whatever aircraft they could lay hands on, as and when they could get into the air - a sort of "limp-handkerchief" technology (if it moves it's too windy to fly).
When one looks closer at the RFC (and later the RAF) in World War One, the organisation required to maintain a very large air force in action is strikingly similar to that set up in World War Two. There were operational training units, flying training schools, specialised maritime, fighter and bomber schools and flying instructors schools. In the UK, there were coastal reconnaissance and defensive fighter squadrons as in World War Two and by the Armistice there was a sizeable equivalent of Bomber Command being organised at British bases. All these required a large number of aircraft and airfields and a major organisation in the shape of factories, acceptance and repair units and construction teams. Although airfield construction was not as elaborate as in World War Two, due to the lack of concrete runways and dispersals, many stations were of permanent character and a fair number of buildings of that era still exist to this day.
Once one has accepted that the current organisation of an air force goes back sixty years, then one's interest tends to become retrospective. The theory has been put forward that such interest in the past is a result of nostalgia for remembrances of one's youth - which makes your editors very youthful-looking 80-year-olds.
It is this potential change in interests which governs publications like AM. One does not throw away the parts which are not of immediate interest. One files them and in ten years time perhaps they become the basis for a new interest. We would like to think that some of the odder items may have started a few members off into pastures new. One of the fascinations of aviation history is that there are so many facets to a single subject which have all been concentrated into one lifetime.
As aviation does not operate in a historical (or geographical) vacuum, interest can stray to other fields - military and naval history, for example. Unfortunately, we tend to lose people that way. Nevertheless, the diversions can add immeasurably not only to one's hobby but to the understanding of the background to recent history.
So the moral is - keep your paperwork filed away, you never know when you may want it. And to those who want to know how one keeps track of it all for thirty years, please don't write to us as we have never found out. However, why should we always have to file paper? The next twenty years might see a revolution in information storage and distribution.
After all, the Egyptians were using paper three thousand years ago so it is time someone thought of something different.
They have. It's called microfilm..."
Much has been written and said about the French Air Force in the years immediately before the Second World War, much of it inaccurate. However, whilst the valour of their pilots cannot be underestimated, like many other continental countries France was unprepared for war, and this unpreparedness showed up in the quality and quantity of aircraft available to their air force. The good types that the Armée de l'Air had were not available in sufficient numbers to make any difference, as like many other countries the aviation industry was organised almost on an 'artisan' basis, unable to switch rapidly to full-scale industrial production when the need arose. And political inertia and interference also meant that time and effort was expended on a number of types that were not suitable for their intended purpose. The French government of the day eventually recognised this, and nationalised the aviation industry in 1937; even then, it was not brought under full-scale state control, thus leaving the nation unprepared for the Blitzkrieg of 1940. France was far from atypical in this respect. It is also a fallacy to think that the French aircraft industry had been 'devastated' by German occupation - a notion that rather conveniently draws a veil over the extensive French collaboration that went on with the Germans, especially in the aeronautical field.
Following the defeat and subsequent armistice in June 1940 the Vichy French authorities had very quickly opened negotiations with their new German masters. On the table was an offer to produce spares for German aircraft manufacturers and establish overhaul and repair facilities for aircraft operating from French territory and in so doing preserve industrial capacity in aviation and preserve employment and some of their manufacturing base in France. In making themselves useful to the Germans, they hoped to avoid all their workers being drafted east to work as 'Auslandarbeiter' in German aircraft factories. This offer was quickly taken up and led to the establishment of so-called Frontbetriebreparatur or FBR plants - advanced overhaul facilities. Junkers set up their FBR at Villacoublay south of Paris. With Ju 88s operating from no fewer than thirty eight aerodromes throughout France at the height of the Battle of Britain the French quickly gained a certain amount of expertise on this particular type. This was 'collaboration', albeit (one suspects and hopes) with a degree of nose-holding and possible tolerance of a degree of sabotage and back-pedalling, in the hope and expectation of better times to come. The Vichy Government thereafter concluded the so-called Wiesbaden Agreement with the Reich to bring the French aircraft industry fully into alignment with German production, with one aircraft or engine out of every three being retained for Vichy, the other two going to Germany. Certain types, such as the Messerschmitt Bf.108, Siebel Si.204 and Fiesler Fi.156 Storch were intended for wholesale transfer of their production to France. And indeed, even the Focke Wulf Fw 190 was intended for this move (and the post-war Armée de l'Air was briefly equipped with home-built Fw 190s, known as the NC.900). While some would argue that the French were not constructing war machines for the Germans, it is nonetheless the case that producing large numbers of transports and seaplanes enabled German industry to concentrate on fighters and other offensive weapons.
As the Germans were expelled from French territory during 1944, determined efforts got underway to re-establish the French aviation industry. As would be the case with other Allied nations, great interest was shown in all manner of weapons systems and aircraft produced by the aircraft manufacturers of the Third Reich. There was another motive for what was to follow - the parlous state of French industry and a total lack of foreign currency naturally led the French to want to seek to exploit the huge quantities of war materiel - spares, parts, tools and jigs - left behind by the retreating Germans. Their factories had produced hundreds of machines for the Germans (both German and French types, eg some 600 Caudron C.445 twins) and they had large stocks of German parts and equipment.
Thus it was that in 1944, the Liberation saw a French aircraft industry ready to move quickly into full-scale production to help rebuild the economy. And as a member of the Allies, France shared in the uncovering of German high technology aviation - and quickly took advantage of that opportunity to quickly produce home-grown examples of the new and exciting jet aircraft. Most of the German types that the French produced were obsolete. In the meantime their 'German' equipment was cost-effective and usually of reasonable quality. These were the reasons that led to the decision to use the Jumo 213 to power the SO-8000 - the British Griffon was too expensive to be imported. The S.N.C.A.S.O. ejection seat came directly from Heinkel. The Me 208 was due to go into series production in France - it did post-war as the Nord 1100 Noralpha.
However in the immediate post-war environment the French were now much more interested in trying to catch up with the new jet and jet engine technologies in which they lagged way behind. They were soon testing examples of the Me 262, He 162, Me 163 and appropriating German materiel and scientists just as the other powers were doing. It was not long before their own outlandish designs were flying, eg SO 6020, 4000, 6000, SO M2. The Arsenal VB. 10 (below) first flew in July 1945.
But the French penchant for "interesting" politics meant that this initial surge of innovation was quickly diluted as designers and factories turned out a bewildering variety of weird and wonderful shapes, both piston- and jet-engined. Some were successful; others were not. Some, like the Dassault MD.450 Ouragan, saw series production and service; others, like the Nord 1500 twin-engined torpedo bomber, were less successful - the Nord in part because its torpedo bay was too small for the torpedoes the French had access to at the time...
This 'special edition' of the French magazine 'La Fana de l'Aviation' tells the story of the six years following liberation and the bewildering variety of aircraft the French industry turned out. In a changing world, the aviation industry everywhere had a hard time keeping up, and France was no exception.
First flight of the Leduc ramjet carried aloft on the SE Languedoc 'mother-ship'
The Leduc ramjet prototype could not take off unassisted (ramjets cannot produce thrust at zero airspeed and thus cannot move an aircraft from a standstill) and was therefore intended to be carried aloft by a parasite aircraft mother ship, such as the four-engined AAS 01A & -B German-origin designs or the French-designed Sud-Est Languedoc four-engined airliners, and released at altitude. Following test flights of the AAS 01/Leduc 0.10 composite, independent unpowered gliding tests began in October 1947. After three such flights, the first powered flight from atop an AAS 01 mother ship was made on 21 April 1949 over Toulouse. Released in a shallow dive at an altitude of 3,050 m (10,010 ft), the engine was tested at half power for twelve minutes, propelling the aircraft to 680 km/h (420 mph).
In subsequent tests, the 0.10 reached a top speed of Mach 0.85 and demonstrated the viability of the ramjet as an aviation powerplant, with a rate of climb of 40 m/s (7,900 ft/min) to 11,000 metres (36,000 ft), exceeding that of the best jet fighters of the time.
Of the two 0.10s originally built, one was destroyed in a crash in 1951 and the other severely damaged in another crash the following year. Both pilots survived with serious injuries.
Generally similar to the 0.10, the Leduc 0.11 featured a Turbomeca Marbore I turbojet on each wingtip, to provide better control during landings. This first flew on 8 February 1951, but was converted back to 0.10 standards (and thereafter referred to as Leduc 010 n°03) a few months later after problems occurred, including misting of the pilot's windows, powerplant synchronization, and wing deflection caused by the turbojets. The engines were replaced by inert mass balances. This aircraft flew 83 test flights and is preserved at Le Bourget.
Practising carrier deck launch procedure on 'Sea Vixens' at Lee-on-Solent, 1962......
or all is not what it seems. These 'modified' Vixens are in fact 'converted Sea Venoms filmed at Lee-on-Solent for the Rank Organisation's 'Look at Life' series (1962). Video below. They were prepared for participation in the Royal Tournament at Earls Court, a venue that could not cater for the weight and size of a 'real' Sea Vixen.
The full story is published in " British Cold War Stories " currently in UK newsagents published by Mortons Media in association with "The Aviation Historian" - a compilation of (previously published) articles that have presumably appeared in the TAH - although nowhere is this stated.
Joachim Castan. Der Rote Baron: Die ganze Geschichte des Manfred von Richthofen. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007. 360 S. EUR 24.50 (cloth), ISBN 978-3-608-94461-7.
Reviewed by Richard Byers (Department of History, North Georgia College and State University)
Published on H-German (July, 2008) " De-mythologizing the Red Baron.."
"....Few figures of aviation history rank higher in popular consciousness than Manfred von Richthofen, the greatest air ace of the First World War, forever immortalized in Western culture as the "Red Baron." Historian and documentary producer Joachim Castan, with assistance from Richthofen's surviving descendants, has written a new biography of the air ace due to the need, in the author's view, to confront the mythological memory of the Red Baron, replete with "gross exaggerations, vulgar clichés, wishful thinking, pure fantasy, beloved legends and bright shining lies" (p. 15), with the "complete" history of his short but illustrious life. The work that results from this approach is a richly-detailed, more nuanced assessment of Richthofen than earlier works, which Castan rightly asserts based their arguments on popular mythological assumptions rather than documentary evidence. Castan's access to Richthofen's personal papers and family archival holdings, cited extensively throughout his account, reinforce his theses and provide a wealth of information for interested scholars and non-scholars, particularly into the family relationships of the Richthofen clan from the beginning of the twentieth century into the First World War and beyond.
Many aspects of this work warrant praise. Castan's documentary background makes him keenly aware of the importance of the role played by the German government and media in transforming Manfred von Richtofen from an unknown airman into a national celebrity. With the death of the previous air "idol," Oswald Boelcke, in late 1916, German military officials embraced and cultivated Richtofen as Boelcke's heir and successor. As a result, Richtofen's meetings with higher officials and the Kaiser were carefully choreographed to maximize their potential as propaganda, both for internal and external consumption. Castan is at his best here, as he narrates the growth of the Red Baron's fame and transformation, by 1917, into wartime Germany's most recognized hero. Additionally, Castan's concluding chapter on the use of Richtofen by the Nazis, and the development of the "Cult of the Red Baron" during their reign, is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the air ace's posthumous legacy, and will be of interest to scholars of the propaganda and mythology of the Third Reich. When he moves into contemporary discussions of Richtofen's utility as an example for the Bundeswehr and NATO, however, he is on less solid ground.
More problematic, though, are Castan's attempts to analyze the Red Baron psychologically, a theme that recurs throughout the work. Correctly confronting the partisan nature of previous literature, which uncritically accepted wartime representations of Richtofen as a paragon of Prussian and German chivalry and honor, Castan draws from Richtofen's 1917 autobiography and unpublished family documents to paint a different picture of the air ace as a cold, amoral aerial predator who sought to hunt and kill his opponents in a manner reminiscent of a game hunter. In Castan's view, Richtofen never viewed his enemies as human; instead, he viewed them as "targets" to be shot, and their aircraft debris as trophies to be displayed at the squadron mess hall, like the preserved heads of vanquished game. Castan repeatedly attempts to explain these realities by resorting to psychological analysis of Richtofen's childhood, adolescence, and family relationships. This process does yield some interesting insights, such as the recognition that Richtofen never developed a normal maternal bond with his mother, but in my opinion Castan's approach never materializes into a convincing case that helps explain Richtofen's actions and motivations. As many readers will recognize, psycho-historical approaches are useful as a tool to help explain the actions of historical actors, but they rarely achieve this aim in isolation from other methodologies. Castan's approach is no exception. At times these sections become repetitive, lessening the impact of the overall narrative, and they tend to minimize the importance of the brutal wartime environment on Richtofen and his contemporaries. Castan correctly points out that Richtofen's perspective on aerial combat was hardly unique; nearly all of the most successful "air aces" of the war possessed the same detached, perhaps pathological attitude toward their actions.
Despite these criticisms, however, this important work furthers our understanding of the First World War's most recognizable figure. It also encourages scholars of German military history to consider a re-evaluation of the conflict and its protagonists, in line with recent research on the conduct and motives of combatants in the Second World War, and to take the ideological atmosphere of the First World War seriously. More similarities may be found between the two conflicts in these terms than previous scholarship has suggested. Additionally, his astute analysis of the problematic nature of German military heroism, and its legacy for present and future generations of German military personnel, is worth serious consideration...."
French carrier Arromanches, and below, scenes on the flight deck of the Arromanches, off French Indochina in the Gulf of Tonkin, circa 1951. Arromanches was a light aircraft carrier of the French Navy, serving from 1946 to 1974. She was previously HMS Colossus of the Royal Navy. The carrier was home to the SB2C Helldivers of flottille 3F and the Hellcats of 11F during the Indochina war (1954)
Arromanches/Colossus was the name-ship of the Colossus class of light carriers. She was commissioned in 1944, but did not see any action in World War II. She served with the British Pacific Fleet in 1945–46, as an aircraft transport and repatriation ship. In 1946, she was loaned to the French Navy, and renamed Arromanches; she was bought by the French in 1951.
Arromanches participated in the First Indochina War in three campaigns from 1948 to 1954, and the Suez Crisis of 1956. In 1968 she was converted to an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) carrier. She was decommissioned in 1974, and broken up in 1978.
ARROMANCHES' aircraft flotille 3F (Helldivers) and 11F (Hellcats) were in action against the Viet Minh over Diên-Biên-Phu on March 13, the day the all-out assault on the camp was launched. That day just 4 Hellcats were overhead. One of them, piloted by the LV DOE of MAINDREVILLE was was lost. Following this the decision was taken to base the carrier's aircraft ashore reducing transit times and pilot workload. Their main mission was to provide Dien-Bien-Phu with maximum fire support against Viet Minh concentrations, artillery and enemy AAA and to ensure the protection of aircraft parachuting food and equipment.
Losses of the 2 flotille during this period:
- 15 March: shot down by anti-aircraft fire, LV LESPINAS of 11F was reported missing aboard his Hellcat 6 km from Dien Bien Phu.
- 31 March: LV ANDRIEUX 3F CO, shot down by anti-aircraft fire 2 km from the Gabrielle support point (KIA)
- April 9: EV LAUGIER (3F) shot down by flak aboard his Helldiver. (KIA)
- April 23: LV Bernard Klotz of 11F was hit by anti-aircraft fire. Jumping clear he was picked up on the ground by the legionnaires of the 13° DBLE. Taken prisoner by the Viet Minh when the camp fell, he was released in September.
- April 26: the Hellcat of SM ROBERT (11F) was hit by anti-aircraft fire. The latter also parachuted but fell into enemy lines. Taken prisoner, he died of exhaustion in the forced march to an internment camp.
Lt. Bernard Klotz's account of his dive-bombing sortie flown on 23 April as a preamble to a counter-attack following the loss of 'Hugette 1' to the Viets;
"...During the night of April 22-23, the enemy seized "Huguette 1". The loss of this fortified position located at the midpoint overlooking the runway was serious- the whole airfield was now dominated by Giap's artillery and by the machine-guns and mortars of his infantry. Even more serious it shrunk the size of the drop zone, reducing the space available for parachuting. The latter ensured the survival of the garrison, provided however that the personnel and equipment dropped by the transport aircraft were recoverable. As of 22 April at least a quarter of what was being parachuted was going to the Viêts. For the camp commander, the loss of "Huguette 1" was unacceptable. He decided to launch a counterattack. First of all, the occupants had to rendered stunned by a large-scale aerial bombardment which had to be effective. It was therefore the Hellcats and Helldivers that de Castries requested first and foremost. As leader of the second 'patrouille' "Savart vert" ('Savart green Leader')I started my dive from 8,000 ft (cf. Windrow p530) with two 500 lb bombs. The weather was excellent. The target was clearly visible. So was the anti-aircraft fire. I had to be very precise. Believing that my attack would not be, I aborted my first attempt and informed my comrade Goizet that I would have to repeat it. He replied that white smoke was billowing from my right wing. I wasn't happy, but the most pressing thing was to drop my bombs on the target. I released them between 2 and 3,000 feet and started to pull out. At that very moment I experienced a violent impact in my machine as my instrument panel exploded. I briefly considered landing on the earthen runway of "Isabelle" which was right in front of me about a minute's flying time away.
I had no time.. My machine was on fire....
In fact, in the seconds that followed, I lived two simultaneous lives. I was two characters at the same time, one whose leitmotif was to say "It's over", and another who would do whatever it took to make the first one lie and thought of nothing but to impose his will on fate. For each of them time had slowed down. Each second was worth a thousand normal seconds. To the first, who kept saying "I'm fucked ", he would scroll his life below and beyond the present moment at which, without a doubt, he would not survive. The second ignored that a bit of doubt, hesitation or clumsiness that would compromise his immediate goal: to get out of this aircraft before it exploded. A pilot does not like to abandon his machine, hence my first idea was to land mine, even on fire, on a nearby runway. The memory of Robin, who had experienced a similar situation on December 5, immediately dissuaded me from doing so. A parachute bail out requires some preliminary operations. First, climb, if possible, so as not to be too low when opening the parachute. At the same time, always if possible, direct the plane towards a favourable area, that is, for "him" outside our lines, but for me, close enough to them so that I did not fall into enemy hands. Two objectives that were difficult to reconcile in this particular case. Then unhook the seat harness, jettison the canopy, stand up, roll the plane - the last act of piloting - and dive into the void with enough effort to prevent the tail or rudder from hitting your head as it flashes past. Once in the atmosphere, all that remains is to deploy the chute. Despite the whining of my double pessimist, I did all of this very well, as if carrying out an exercise, except for the last but essential manoeuvre. To deploy the parachute you have to pull on a handle. It's simple. So that's what I did. But the handle came off in my hand. The cable connected to this handle was broken. The parachute would not open. I had no idea how to proceed ignoring the secrets of its functioning. While my 'double' kept up the mantra, "..this time it's really over" I stubbornly sought another solution. I imagined it lay behind my back thinking that maybe, although without seeing or knowing, I would be be able to do something manually. Instead of crossing my arms on my chest, I flung them behind me to rummage around on my back. It was at that moment, when I must have been free-falling at around 750 feet, that the parachute mush-roomed open but, as it unfolded, the lines suddenly carried my misplaced arms with them and dislocated my right shoulder..."
Klotz was rescued by Legionnaires after coming down in the camp and was taken captive on 7 May 1954 with the fall of Dien Bien Phu. He survived the long march into captivity and was finally released by the Viet Minh in September 1954.
At that time he had flown 1090 hours, carried out 180 combat sorties over Vietnam and made 187 carrier landings in the Hellcat.
This was only the start of a long career that saw him command 16F (Etendard IVP) and the French carrier Foch. His memoir covering his three tours in Vietnam was entitled "Enfer au paradis" (Ardhan)
"..Thousands of combat sorties have been flown, tens of thousands of terrorists and their infrastructure have been destroyed, and hundreds of Syrian cities and towns have been liberated. Russian pilots, special ops, marines, doctors, and diplomats have spent two years helping the lawful president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, hold his country together and rid it of terrorists..."
By the autumn of 2015, the war in Syria had already dragged on for four long years. " The greatest human disaster of the 21st Century ", as described by Christopher Phillips, saw more than 50% of a population of some 20 million internally displaced or fleeing abroad. The mass anti-government demonstrations that began in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa had quickly escalated into skirmishes with the military. And terrorist factions immediately “hijacked” these popular protests. Soon, the leading role in the battle against the ruling regime was being played by extremists from the Islamic State, Jabhat Al Nusra, Al-Qaeda, and many factions within what has been called the “moderate opposition” – mainly in the Free Syrian Army championed by the West. Large tracts of Syrian territory had fallen under the control of anti-government groups.. The Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War began in September 2015, after an official request by the Syrian government for military aid against these rebel and jihadist groups. The so-called "Aviation Group" of the Russian Air Force in Syria moved into the Khmeimim air base in Latakia province in the north-west of the country and started air strikes against militant groups opposed to the Syrian government..
Ever since, Russian military capabilities and intentions - in Syria and beyond - have been under scrutiny. According to Tom Cooper in this rather slim but impressive new book published by Helion in the UK, " ..to many, the performance of the Russian military - and especially the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) - in this war was a clear demonstration of advanced technology, improved training, fearsome firepower, and great mobility......to others, the military operation only experienced limited success and exposed a number of weaknesses. Foremost among the latter were aircraft ill-suited to the necessities of expeditionary warfare, and a gross lack of advanced weaponry and equipment..."
So despite the appearance of the latest T-90 tanks in Middle Eastern deserts, cruise missile firing warships and submarines in the Mediterranean, cyber attacks, and robotic drones hovering over Syrian targets, Russia's war in Syria was primarily fought by Russian aviation. Among a whole series of combat 'debuts' Putin even deployed long-range Tu 160 Blackjack, Tu 95 MSM and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, some flying from the Arctic, around the British Isles, past Gibraltar, to drop precision bombs and launch cruise missiles against IS targets in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor as well as targets in the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. This was following the Metrojet A321 terrorist bombing over Sinai in October 2015 with heavy loss of Russian life. The first combat sorties were flown from Russia’s sole aircraft carrier stationed in the Med, although after two machines were lost through accidents the carrier's Su 33 aircraft were subsequently deployed ashore. And while there was plenty of ancient technology on view at Khmeimim (in particular the Su 25 attack aircraft) and some 50% of all ground-attack sorties were flown by the Su 24 Fencer, a handful of the latest fighter bombers - particularly the highly capable Sukhoi Su 34, able to carry Western-style precision-guided munitions- also saw their combat debuts in Syria.
From December 2017 when Putin declared the war was won, it was clear that Russian intervention - along with that of their close Iranian allies - had been instrumental in restoring Syrian Army morale, driving out civilians from rebel-held areas and bringing about a turning point in the Syrian Civil War. Organized and run in cooperation with very diverse allies - ranging from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran (IRGC), Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Kurdishan Workers Party (PKK) and a myriad of local warlords and their armed militias - their combination of intentional bombardment of insurgent-controlled parts of Syria -with no scruples shown about killing the many thousands of civilians that found themselves in the firing lines - and indirect protection for the IRGC's own military intervention in the country from a possible counter-intervention of the West, the Russians effectively saved President Bashar al-Assad's regime.
By the end of 2017, Russian intervention had led to the recapture of Palmyra from ISIL (March 2016), the retaking of the major city of Aleppo (December 2016), the breaking of the three-year-long siege of Deir ez-Zor in the east of the country and the establishment of full control over that city. (November 2017). For more than a year Deir ez-Zor’s garrison and population had relied on SyAAF Mi-8 helicopters as their only lifeline. The Russians flew air-drop sorties with IL-76 transports alongside the UN’s own airdrop efforts. Sukhoi 30 SMs flew escort for these missions. In early January 2018, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov said that, overall, Russian aviation had carried out 19,160 combat missions and delivered 71,000 strikes on "the infrastructure of terrorists". At the end of December 2017, the Russian defence minister stated that over 48,000 service members had ″gained combat experience″ during the Russian operation in Syria. And as Tom Cooper points out Moscow had achieved a minor miracle on the geo-strategic level - a brutal dictatorship involved in the systematic elimination of many thousands of its own people, and frequently with the help of chemical weapons, was made popular in both far-right and the far-left circles alike around the World. In addition the resulting flow of refugees destabilized the European Union and large parts of NATO - two parties considered the actual primary opponents by the government in Moscow - and increased the popularity of the President Vladimir Putin to unprecedented levels.
Illustrated with more than 130 photographs, maps and many of Tom Cooper's excellent colour artworks, 'Moscow's Game of Poker' provides a well-written text outlining the myriad participants in this extremely complex conflict, and the areas it impacted. It provides a ‘unique and in-depth study of Moscow's political aims, strategy, doctrine, target selection process, military technology and tactics’ in what was Moscow’s most ambitious overseas operation since Afghanistan. In refusing another US-led regime-change so close to home Russia had faced down the West on the international stage and re-asserted a key presence in the Middle East. This story is told in combination with insights into the similar campaign run by what was left of the Syrian Arab Air Force..
According to the blurb Tim Ripley's "Operation Aleppo - Putin's war in Syria' fills a badly-needed gap in Western public knowledge about the current capabilities of the Russian state..."
I don't necessarily agree with the author's assertion that " ..Putin's military is much more advanced than we thought it was..". The West were simply unable to reconcile the conflict in their world view - on the one hand Obama had to fight and defeat ISIS terrorists, but that meant effectively aiding and abetting the cruel despot Assad. For the Russians there was no 'moderate' opposition in Syria - they were all 'terrorists'. The West (the US and Obama ) found themselves advocating regime change again - but this time the country concerned had already largely fallen to the various terrorist groupings. So in the West there was much 'hand-wringing' but little action. And while the West backed away, Putin had no such scruples, especially since these Muslim Jihadis were far too close to home for comfort..
The use of long-range strategic aviation to bombard ISIS not only showed off Russia’s strike capability but allowed its ‘Aviation Group’ to continue its core task of supporting the Syrian Army in its on-going ground offensive. According to author Ripley the deployment of attack helicopters was decisive for the ground offensive - another Syria combat 'first' were the Kamov KA 52 helicopter gunships operating alongside MI 28 helicopter gunships deployed against Islamic State. According to the Russian Defence Ministry the advanced and potent KA 52 helicopter gunships were used alongside the MI28s to support Syrian army operations around Palmyra. The Syrian army needed to take full control of the territory around Palmyra before it could risk an advance on Deir ez-Zor in the south-east of the country. A failure to do so risked an Islamic State counter attack on Palmyra as the Syrian army was advancing towards Deir ez-Zor. The Syrian army scored a major success on 3 April 2016 with the liberation of the traditionally Christian town of Al-Qaryatayn.
On Putin′s orders, the Russian aviation grouping comprising more than 50 aircraft, had started to intensify their campaign from late 2015. The mass cruise missile strikes carried out against ISIS in Deir ez Zor province on 20 November resulted in the death of more than 600 militants according to the ministry. However as in any war there were some losses. The shooting down of a Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft by a Turkish Air Force F-16 on 24 November 2015 led to seven months of very strained relations with the Turks - and almost resulted in the first clash of a NATO member country with Russia. The unfortunate pilot was shot and killed by Syrian rebels while descending by parachute. Elsewhere as many as four KA 52 attack helicopters were lost in a conflagration at the T4 air base in central Syria when it came under mortar attack from rebel forces.
Ripley's account ends in December 2017 with the war in Syria apparently won. Although there have been few communiques from the Defence ministry since, bombing raids have been flown by the VKS on nearly every day during 2018 There are still large areas of Syrian territory that appear to be under rebel control. In Feb 2018 Major Roman Filipov, the Russian pilot of a Su-25 jet that was downed by an anti-aircraft MANPAD over Syria's north-western Idlib province, died in particularly horrible circumstances. After coming down by parachute - apparently behind 'rebel' lines- Jihadis closed in to take him captive. "..Major Roman Filipov waged an unequal battle to the last minutes of his life, with regular weapons, fending off militants. Finally, with the encircling terrorists closing in, and being seriously wounded, when the distance to the militants was reduced to several tens of meters, the Russian officer blew himself up with a grenade .the pilot died heroically," Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman added. "We are proud of our heroes."
The UK Daily Telegraph reported subsequently that ".. Russia intensified their raids on Idlib overnight and into Monday morning in retaliation. Civil defence workers said air raids struck the towns of Kafr Nubl and Maasran, as well as the cities of Saraqeb, Maarat al Numan and Idlib, and that several deaths and dozens of injuries were reported as rescuers dug through the rubble. A hospital was hit in Maarat al Numan and at least five people were feared killed in another attack that damaged a residential building in Kafr Nubl. Video recorded by rescuers showed hospitals workers moving premature babies from destroyed incubators, trying to protect them from the dust. In Idlib city, the provincial capital, one witness said a five-storey building was levelled and that at least fifteen people were feared dead. Air strikes on Saturday after the downing of the jet killed at least 10 people, including children, in Khan al Subl near where the plane crashed, rescuers said. "We are pulling bodies from under collapsed walls. The Russians are taking their revenge on civilians, many of whom were already displaced and had fled their homes from earlier bombardment," said Ahmad Hilal, a civil defence rescuer. A chemical attack was also reported in the northwestern town of Saraqeb, where five people were admitted to hospital experiencing difficulty breathing. Assad forces are thought to have carried out three chlorine attacks on civilian areas in the last four days, in contravention of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Syrian army and its Iranian Shia militias allies made a string of gains in the last week after capturing a major air base that brought them just 7.5 miles from Saraqeb, the first heavily populated city in Idlib within their reach. They were pushing towards the main Damascus-Aleppo highway, the capture of which would cut rebel supply lines and open the door to an army advance into the heart of the province..."
Tim Ripley's lengthy and carefully prepared work has come mostly from open 'intelligence' sources such as the above - commercial satellite imagery, social media accounts and photographs posted by Russian soldiers and airmen and sailors (that help locate them and date them in Syria), from Russian, Iranian and other TV and journalistic sources, from industrial and diplomatic sources and from senior western defence sources.
Fake news? Some of it, possibly. I do think the book suffers from a little lack of objectivity. But the author does acknowledge this - bomb damage assessment, for instance, is hard to come by. Details and dates of Russian transport ship movements and their on-deck military cargoes, as well as data widely available on line from flight radar tracking websites involving transport into Syria via refuelling stops in Iran in many instances connect them to major Russian military operations in support of the Syrian army.
This is a book for defence writers as much as for the general public. It not only tells, for example, of the death of Russian Special Forces soldier Artyum Gorbynov, 24, as he was protecting a group of Russian military advisers outside Palmyra on 2nd March 2017, but also that his team engaged an ISIS vehicle-born suicide bomber "with a 9K113 Konkurs anti-tank missile,' and was also shown in Russian news video directing air strikes by Mil Mi-28 attack helicopters.
With so much Russian hardware in Syria, one might wonder how they avoided running into the US, British and other forces.
We learn that deconfliction - not entirely successful - was by means of hot line phones between Russian, Syrian and allied command headquarters - this was especially the case for the American cruise missile blitz on Shayrat in April 2017 following a Syrian Air Force bombing raid using chemical weapons that resulted in many civilian deaths - Russian and Syrian personnel were able to take cover before some fifty-odd cruise missiles blitzed the airbase wiping out virtually what was left of the Syrian Air Force..
All in all, this is a sobering and useful book which reveals exactly why, if the West instinctively found itself shouting from the sidelines, Putin's Russia had the resources, the desire and capability to plant its own flag and change the geopolitical face of the Middle East. And it was a 'good' media-led war for Putin which succeeded mightily in deflecting attention from the war in the Ukraine which was not so popular at home...
However Ripley's self-published work just misses out on 5 stars due to inadequate proof reading and a hopelessly inadequate photo section - with all the many fine images made available by the Russian MOD (as here) there really should have been more and in colour!
Below; Assad visiting Khmeimim air base and trying out a Flanker super-fighter Su 35S for size..
Other links and references of interest including more pages of this blog;
