Some terrible stills from dashcam footage shown on the "jeffostroff" youtube channel depict the final moments of UPS Flight 2976, a scheduled domestic cargo flight from Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport that went down on 4 November 2025. The aircraft struggles to clear the perimeter fence, its landing gear ploughing through the roof of a storage building before the wing clips high tension cables. Minus its port engine the heavily laden machine is already well ablaze and slowly veering to the left..
The MD-11F (N259UP) lost the port no. 1 engine presumably after a catastrophic failure as the aircraft was passing V1 (rotate speed) as it hurtled down runway 17R. Forced to continue with its takeoff, the aircraft rotated off the active runway, as the number one engine departed the aircraft, coming to rest next to runway 17R. The MD-11F reached a maximum altitude of only 175 feet and a highest ground speed recorded of 186 knots. By this stage the aircraft was uncontrollable and, seconds later, impacted a semi truck parking area, destroying multiple buildings and vehicles. Sadly, three crew members on board, along with 11 people on the ground, were killed. Another tragic and cruel accident. A small extract from 'freight dog' Chris van Heijst on FB;
".. Without going into deep speculation, it seems obvious the aircraft experienced a catastrophic engine separation just after V1 speed. No possibility to stop the aircraft anymore: they had to continue. And engine number 2 failed just during rotation, quite possibly due to ingestion of debris from the fiercely burning wing, sealing their fate. I can’t help thinking what I would or could have done in such a scenario. My only conclusion is: nothing at all. A typical black swan event; an extremely rare, unpredictable occurrence with massive impact..."
Sometimes there is simply nothing that can be done.
and from Nico Wissink to provide some context -engine separations are not unheard of;
"..This accident when I first saw it gave me flashbacks to the National crash in Bagram, one I had on my schedule for weeks and escaped because we were 2 days behind schedule. I finally can watch the videos again. There are several similarities between the 2 accidents, everything is fine until after V1 or rotation, and all of a sudden things happen that make the airplane completely unable to fly, with a crew fighting for their lives but really just along for a very short ride.
Many accidents have a crew component as for the cause, these two don't have that.
Engine separations are not unheard of, but quite unusual. At one airline in 2004 a classmate had been the captain of a L1011 out of MIA that had an engine separation right after rotation. They came back around, and that incident is long forgotten. The DC10 accident at ORD has been mentioned a lot. Maintenance people used incorrect procedures to change an engine, by removing the pylon with engine attached, which is a no-no. You leave the pylon attached to the wing. Kalitta had a 747-200 lose one over Lake Michigan. ELAL had the crash in AMS on a 747-200 where an engine separated, rolled under the wing and knocked its neighbor off. Weak shear pins were the cause for both of these, and ever since we have not had any. This UPS MD11 just came out of heavy check, and I think we will find the answer there. The delay before departure was from excessive vibration on the previous flight. We shall wait and find out. But yes, the cargo community is shocked..."
The last six months or so have seen some dreadful aviation accidents/crashes and the Air India Dreamliner/787 crash on 12 June 2025 just after takeoff from Ahmedabad, India has to be one of the most notorious/awful. There has been much discussion/speculation on various online forums and among the plethora of youtube pilot 'experts'. There are the usual calls for all discussion/speculation to be clamped down on - once the self-appointed 'experts' have had their 'say' of course. In this instance the 'conclusions' are not pleasant reading for the airliner crew/pilot fraternity as once again we find ourselves facing a situation where the responsibility for the deaths of 240 or so hapless passengers may have to be placed firmly at their door. Even despite the reluctance of the official interim report to call a spade a spade. This crash is among the worst of the last ten years or so - and yet we still have to wait another 12 months or so for the 'official' verdict. Those poor families..
..The Air India B787 interim accident report focuses on the operation - apparently shortly after takeoff - of the (mechanical) fuel cut off switches. That they were operated - mechanically and not as the result of some glitch or accidental movement caused by vibration - is apparently confirmed by the CVR (voice recorder) and the time stamp details. But there must have been more said after the 'why did you operate the cut off' and the response 'I did not do so' - in fact why even say it out loud? Put them back on to 'Run' immediately rather than wait ten seconds. (no it wasn't just a 'couple of seconds' as some have said). Nor does the report state what the engines were doing prior to these switches being flipped off and on - was the non-flying pilot attempting to restart the engines after a loss ofpower?
Below; extract from the incident report showing the fuel cut off switches and the throttle control module recovered from the crashed airliner.
As former B777 captain Dan Gryder shows in his 'Probable Cause' video (below) it is the action of just 4 seconds to switch both fuel cut off switches back into the run position. Of course, still climbing out, the aircraft was too low to recover, as probably the (culpable?) pilot intended. There is no further comment published in the interim report. A former air investigator commented on the BBC;
" ..it is very disappointing to read a report which provides a few salient details but leaves more questions unanswered.."
The pilot flying the take off (both hands on yoke) is not likely to have operated the switches but would he have noticed the other pilot (aircraft captain, hand perhaps covering the throttles as is normal practise) doing this manual action twice in quick succession? Would he not have exclaimed ' what are you doing?!' He may have been too stunned/numb to immediately react. There's no clue from the abridged (?) transcript from the CVR of the tone and inflection of the crew's words. In the shock of the moment did the crew use their native tongue, and was at least some of what they said lost in translation? Likewise the response, "I didn't do so." Was this indignant? Defensive? Accusatory?
As the BBC commentator put it, " the very worst reports are those designed to be read 'between the lines'... " - intimating that this is what we have here.
While Dan Gryder speculates his theory (see video below) it has been reported by Indian media that the investigation is NOT focussing on a human action causing the fuel switches to appear in the CUTOFF position, but on a system failure. Service Bulletins by Boeing issued in year 2018 recommending to upgrade the fuel switches to locked versions to prevent inadvertent flip of the switches, as well as the FAA/GE issued Service Bulletin FAA-2021-0273-0013 Attachment 2 relating to loss of control issue (also see above) were NOT implemented by Air India. The stated MN4 computer with faulty soldering, that might weaken and lose contact due to the thermal stress after a number of cycles, interprets data and commands fuel metering valves - with the lost contact attaching the MN4 processor to the EEC intermittent electrical contact, loss of signal processing and engine control faults can occur. The SB writes under conditions for the SB: "An LOTC (Loss Of Thrust Control) event has occurred due to an EEC MN4 microprocessor solder ball failure." According to discussions in the industry it may be possible with the number of cycles VT-ANB had already completed, the solder balls were weakened sufficiently to detach the MN4 from the EEC momentarily due to loads during the takeoff rotation leading to the loss of control of thrust and shut down of the engines.
Maybe there will be more in the official accident report to be published in around 12 months time. In the mean time all we can do is 'speculate' as the authorities leave an information 'vacuum'. Incidentally 'Mentour Pilot' has recently highlighted a Chinese air crash caused by a murder/suicide pilot where the official report will not/has not been published for reasons of 'social cohesion'.
In the short 8-minute video below Dan Gryder offers his analysis. Just a single click on the red button enables you to watch this short video here.
.. a shocking tragedy, 179 killed while on the ground. Most reports focusing on the 'concrete' ILS transponder 'wall' off the end of the runway, presumably because reporters know something about brick walls - they certainly know little about the B737. If I hear another Sky News reporter say that the 'landing gear' was not working....
There's only one logical explanation for that B737 to come in and attempt a 'crash' landing in the configuration that it did. The airliner came in like a glider and put down on its belly ..because it was glider. The landing gear on the B737 does not fail - it can be deployed manually by pulling on the three long cables behind the seats in the cockpit. The glider 'theory' obviously presumes that neither engine was developing full thrust; after all the B737 can operate reasonably comfortably on one engine and redundancy is such that one engine can power most nearly all of the systems. Coming in as a glider though immediately poses other problems, horribly evident on watching the video footage - the ground effect meant that the aircraft 'floated' along the runway ..and put down far too long. With the airliner flying like a glider, the landing gear and flaps could not be deployed - minimal drag configuration was perhaps the only way the crew could stand a chance of getting back to the runway. The other possibility, as mentioned by Juan Brown on his Blancolerio channel - given the elapse of only 7 minutes from birds strike to touch-down - is that the crew didn't have time to run through any check list and failed to deploy the gear. That doesn't bear thinking about. And from what the commentator below says (Max Afterburner channel) in this 'NO-TIME' scenario, the crew didn't/wouldn't/couldn't run through their emergency check-list that includes gear down where a decision has to be taken immediately. I used to hate check-lists. Although they exist and you could consult them, in a real emergency you simply don't have the time to consult them - you need to know them! (all 100 pages of the emergency procedures section!) The crew fought to keep the machine airborne for as long as possible, that is the only explanation that fits what we have seen. With the tragic consequences we have all witnessed. A single click to view the video here..
Getty Images slide-show courtesy of Getty Images for non-commercial websites
Screen shots of the mid-air at the Wings over Dallas airshow involving the B-17 "Texas Raider" (44-83872) and P-63 "TEST" (42-68941), both of the Commemorative Air Force. Unfortunately the B17 was in the Kingcobra's blind spot under its nose and appears to hit the B17 around the waist gunner's position severing the tail off.
" ..Just got back home from Dallas and the Wings Over Dallas put on by the CAF. It is their largest show. It was shut down due to one of their B-17s colliding with a P-63 King Cobra at the south end of the airport just before the runway area. The information as to how many people on board the B-17 has not been released nor has their status. The crash occurred during their flying routine with several B-17s, some B-25s, some P-51s, a B-24 and a P-63. At first, it was thought to be some pyro technics going off at the wrong time, but when the fire went out of control for the two airport firetrucks to contain, most people realized it was something else. The airshow was shut down and all spectators were ordered to leave the airport. When I left there were about 40 different first responder vehicles at the scene, along with a Med-Vac helicopter and a few news helicopters. The explanation as to what happened has not been released, but the bombers were lining up to portray a bomber sweep with fighter aircraft flying cover that would pass at a low level parallel to one of the runways running north and south where the air show crowd was gathered. It happened as the group was turning to approach the runway from the south..." georgeusa on BM
"... the P-63 banked pointing his belly at the B-17 ..[and].. he completely lost situational awareness doing this. He could no longer see the B-17. The P-63 already has terrible blind spots. An aircraft overtaking a slower aircraft is responsible to keep view of that aircraft. This was totally preventable, from the planning, controlling, and the flying. And yes, I trained and I am qualified in Human Factors facilitation in military aviation. There are far too many warbird owners who should not be in the cockpit. The aviation safety net is supposed to prevent these types of accidents..." scooby on BM
On May 22, 2020, Pakistan International Airlines Flight PK 8303 crashed into a residential area close to Karachi Airport. Nearly 100 people lost their lives. The aircraft on this flight was an Airbus A320, with the registration AP-BLD.
This crash has stimulated the usual debate and speculation. When the full story is known there is a good chance that this accident will prove to be one of the most appalling cases of pilot error ever in a commercial aviation disaster. There have been numerous accidents as a result of blatant pilots' errors, but they were usually part of a chain of events involving one or other external cause (the weather, a technical malfunction of some sort, a difficult approach / terrain). Incredibly - and tragically- it appears that the pilots attempted a landing having omitted to deploy the landing gear after flying in on a 'high and hot' approach - referred to by the professionals as 'unstablized', possibly unaware that their speed exceeded the Airbus limits for lowering the undercarriage on the A320 (VIe speed). Coming in too fast over the threshold the aircraft perhaps 'floated' too far along the runway but when the engines hit the runway and scraped along the ground, the pilots - one of whom had 17,000 hours in his log-book - almost 'instinctively' attempted to lift off and go around. Or perhaps they were simply running out of runway at that stage with no means of slowing or braking. Having damaged the engines, both power plants then failed during the go-around and the aircraft' glided' down at a steep angle of attack into a residential area close to the airport.
but there are so many questions and much speculation;
- how did the flight crew manage to not hear the cacophony of noise being made by the alarms warning that the gear was not deployed. Complacency ? didn't bother with the check-list? stuck in the 'zone' ?
- why did the tower not warn them about their gear ?
- was this a 'failed' go-around, gear being retracted too late and the sink-rate taking the aircraft onto the tarmac ? This scenario is examined in detail in the second video below.
Juan Browne on the 'blancolirio' youtube channel has some of the best analysis but here you can watch a carefully compiled simulation by 'Captain Mayday' ...a single click to view
Below; first CCTV image screen-shot from "Captain Mayday" video on youtube
The most crucial data sets used in this video are:
- ADS-B Transponder Data from Flight 8303 (source: Flightradar24.com)
- Eyewitness pictures (source: different media)
- ATC transmission of flight PK8303
- Airbus A320 Standard Operating Procedures
- Airbus A320 system and failures simulation
- The simulation is based on the Airbus A320 from FSLabs for Prepar3d
Phantom FGR.2 of 228 OCU, XV428 CC, seen at Leuchars during the first half of 1988. This special livery was applied for the airshow circuit. Sadly the aircraft was destroyed in an accident at RAF Abingdon in Sept. 1988
Above; Mark Smith photo, Wethersfield, June 1988. Posted on the British F-4 Phantom group on FB.
On 23 September 1988, the crew of XV428 flew to RAF Abingdon to carry out a display practise prior to the air display the next day..
On arrival at Abingdon, they overflew the airfield at 2000ft before running in for their practice. During this overflight, they confirmed that the minimum height for the display was to be 500ft and they discussed the position of the display line and crowd centre. They were passed the surface wind as being between 240 & 330
degrees at 10 to 20 kts with occasional gusts to 30kts.
Having cleared the airfield area, XV428 then ran in from the west along the display axis parallel to and north of runway 08 with the crowdline 780ft to their right.
The aircraft was well to the right of crowd centre after completing a left 360 degrees hard turn since no allowance appeared to have been made for the strong wind. It was seen to roll out of the turn and immediately enter a very hard pull up using full reheat.
As it approached the top of the loop, the aircraft appeared to be slower and lower than usual and at the apex, it was seen to fly in the inverted position for several seconds; the pilot appeared to be 'pushing' and maintaining level flight. During the second half of the loop, the initial pitch rate to the vertical appeared slow and at the vertical the aircraft was alarmingly low. From there on the pull became increasingly hard and some wing rock occured and just before impact the aircraft achieved a nose up attitude of 10-15 degrees but with a massive rate of descent. The Phantom impacted tail first some 819ft from and parallel to the crowd line. It disintegrated immediately and wreckage came no closer than 400ft to the crowd line. The crew were killed on impact with the ground. A very sad day indeed at Abingdon, RIP Flt Lt Chris Lackman and Flt Lt Thompson..
Mark Smith photo
Incidentally, Chris Lackman had converted to the Phantom from Vulcans,
he was one of the 'Black Buck 6' crew during Falklands.
Chris Lackman was also the Vulcan copilot on Black Bucks 4, 5 and 6, the defence suppression missions flown from ASI to the Falklands. Black Buck 6 resulted in an emergency diversion into Rio International. Chris's captain was awarded the DFC for that mission but Chris also played a big part in the recovery, which was touch and go all the way in with the aircraft de-pressurised at 45,000 ft, the door hatch open and difficult to re-close, the crew on pressure breathing for 30 mins, and with 2 Northrop F-5s in chase. The aircraft landed with only 1500 lbs of fuel (insufficient for one visual circuit). For the very first time (and after some 34 years) this story has now been told in its entirety in Tony Blackman's book, Vulcan Boys. This story has never been told before, which includes technical detail of how the Shrike missiles were launched against Argentinian radars, the diversion into Rio, and the involvement of the CIA and Pope John Paul VI in the crew's release. A riveting read.
Having posted recently about the terrible loss rates of the Starfighter, it is perhaps worth mentioning that they were apparently no worse than those of the EE Lightning. Of course more Starfighters crashed than Lightnings were actually built, but approaching a third of all RAF Lightnings did crash (nearly 90 machines). The problem is that no matter how professional any maintenance crew is, aircraft like the Lightning are/were inherently more subject to failures compared to other types because of their design. A look at the typical loss rates of the Lightnings or most other supersonic fighters designed in the '50s will show that even during their service lives, while being maintained by trained and experienced personnel with immediate access to spare parts and expense not an issue, failures did occur in relatively large numbers...
Back in 2009 one of three then airworthy EE Lightnings operated by Thunder City crashed at an airshow in South Africa killing experienced test pilot Dave Stock. I've spent the day reading the 136-page accident report which is quite horrific..
Of course we've had the Hunter Shoreham crash since then but this report rams or rammed home the potential dangers of operating such complex kit without the support infrastructure they had whilst in service with the military. Even in the 1960s fuel leaks were commonplace and a major potential fire hazard due to the inherent design of the machine. Engine bay fires frequently resulted in loss of flight controls, commonly heat failure of the v-jack controlling the elevator. Fires and Lightnings do not mix and SOP was to eject. Only in the Thunder City crash the ejection seat was long over-due maintenance and did not function.
Quoting from 'Lightning Boys';
"...Other exceptional modifications developed for the Lightning involved wrapping all hydraulic connections with fire proof tape, so that any spray leaks there (highly inflammable) would be turned into drip leaks (far less so). Procedures too evolved; eventually all hydraulic unions in hot areas were x-rayed after being squeezed into exactly the right shape. And, by 1982, no maintenance due point would be extended (a trivial practice on most aircraft types, within reason) without an internal inspection of engine compartments while the aircraft was restrained and run in double re-heat on the de-tuner. (The de-tuner was so-called because to call it a "silencer" would probably have infringed the Trade Descriptions Act.). Many times these inspections ended any thoughts of an extension of flying hours and the aircraft was brought smartly into the hangar for some urgent rectification.
In all, in engineering terms, operating the Lightning was a challenge. Working on it was difficult, and what was done had to be perfect because the aircraft could be very unforgiving..."
Graham Perry, former senior engineering officer 11 Sqn and later commander of the engineering wing at Binbrook
extract from "Tribute to a Legend from the Overberg" by James Clash
" ..I noticed an article about the air show in the Cape Town Times. A fighter jet developed problems with its hydraulics, and the pilot managed to steer away from the crowd and dump fuel. Then, after three attempts he said, “Ejection seat failure” and crashed in a fireball. The pilot was Dave Stock and the aircraft was the Lightning I had flown in. Writing this now, my thoughts shift from me to Stock and back. I can’t help wondering: Had the hydraulics failed a day earlier, on our flight (the last on which Stock took a commercial passenger), would I be alive? I believe Stock thought he would be fine on his air-show flight, until the end. His aircraft had flown for a half-century without incident and was well-maintained at Thunder City. He methodically attacked the problem by using his air skills — first, to point the plane away from 40,000 spectators, and second, to dump fuel to reduce the size of a crash explosion. Finally, he planned to eject at the last minute. From his stated confidence in the equipment, he had no idea he was going to die until the seat failed....."
Below, left; " Alles in Ordnung " - Luftwaffeninspekteur General Josef Kammhuber climbing down from the back-seat of an F-104 F to be greeted by Defence minister Franz Josef Strauss on 22 July 1960 in Nörvenich...
The Bundesluftwaffe (Federal German air force) was the primary user of the Starfighter, operating over thirty-five percent of all F-104s built and received a total of 916 Starfighters (30 F-104 Fs, 96 F-104 Gs, and 136 TF-104 Gs from Lockheed, 255 F/RF-104 Gs from the North Group, 210 F-104 Gs from the South Group, 88 F-104 Gs from the West Group, 50 F/RF-104 Gs from the Italian Group, plus 50 replacement F-104 Gs from MBB to replace some of those lost in crashes). At their peak in the mid-1970s, Starfighters equipped five nuclear-armed Luftwaffe fighter-bomber wings, two interceptor wings, and two reconnaissance wings. In addition, two attack wings of the Marineflieger (Federal German Navy) were equipped with Starfighters. The first German Starfighters were the Lockheed-built two-seat F-104 Fs which were initially used in the USA to train German instructors. At that time, the F-104 Fs were painted with standard USAF insignia and carried USAF serial numbers. These machines were then handed over to Waffenschule 10 under Mjr. Hans-Ulrich Flade, which was based at Nörvenich, near Cologne, BRD (Federal Republic). After handover, they were repainted in Luftwaffe insignia and assigned German serial numbers. They began converting pilots for JBG 31 in July of 1960. The first operational unit to be equipped with the F-104 G - the Gustav - was Jagdbombergeschwader 31 "Boelcke" (JBG31) under Kommodore Barkhorn, also based at Norvenich. JBG 31 became fully operational in 1963.
Lockheed F-104 G cn 2083 DC 234 JaboG 33 Buchel 1967 (Francillion photo archive)
On 20 June 1962 the official commissioning of the WS F-104 G "Starfighter" was planned for JaboG 31 at the Fliegerhost Nörvenich. The day prior to this, 19 June, the dress rehearsal of the short-lived aerobatics Schwarm F-104 F of the WaSLw 10 took place. This formation was due to present the F-104 to the numerous guests at the commissioning ceremony. The following aircrew were involved;
John Speer (4./WS 10, "Lead", USAF Advisory Group; BB+370),
Olt. Heinz Frye (flight instructor 2./WS10; BB+378),
Olt. Bernd Kuebart (Squadron Captain 2./WS10, ex JaboG 31; BB+365),
Olt. Wolfgang von Stürmer (flight instructor 4./WS10, ex WaSLw 10 Oldenburg; BB+385) as well as
Major Tom Perfili ("Solo", USAF).
Olt. Bernd Kuebart and Olt. Wolfgang von Stürmer were among the first six pilots in 1960 to retrain for the F-104 in Palmdale, California.
The program for this demonstration was practiced several times in the past. With the call sign "Starfighters" the formation took off in the afternoon. After take-off in "Finger Tip Formation" the first two figures were flown correctly. Major Tom Perfili waited in the holding position for his solo performance, which was planned about 15 minutes later. About 10 minutes after take-off some 8 km eastern distant and above the brown coal open pit mine Knapsack (near Hürth) clouds of smoke were seen in the sky. What had happened?
As "lead" John Speer had tried to come back over the airfield with the Schwarm as fast as possible. He cut through a small cloud bank in an elevated 180° (right) curve and overturned the machines then flying in "Diamond" formation so far that pulling out was no longer possible. Probably due to John Speer's spatial disorientation the formation left the cloud at too steep angle (in an almost vertical attitude) downwards. Olt. Wolfgang von Stürmer, who was flying at the rear of the formation and thus had the best overview, tried in vain to pull up his machine.
" ..Without haste the Schwarm leader, US Captain John Speer, gave the commands, as he had done every previous manoeuvre, with a calm voice via radio. This was to be the last one. In the operations tower of the Nörvenich air base, suddenly those present heard; "Hau ab! (Get away!), immediately followed by, "Hold it!" (Hold the machine!), then "My God!".
At that moment, on Tuesday of last week, just after four in the afternoon, the disaster could no longer be stopped. Two of the four Starfighters had touched each other with their stubby 2.50 meter-long wings.. They sagged and dragged the other two machines with them. The four aircraft burst into pieces; their debris bored into the lignite mine of the Fürstenberg briquette factory near Frechen, which was covered with a layer of mud. The four pilots, apart from the US captain the Bundeswehr lieutenant Kuebart, Frye and von Stürmer, were killed instantly..."
(Der Spiegel 26/162)
In the period that followed, those responsible at the time endeavoured to minimise the circumstances of the incident so as not to give the impression that it was an aerobatics flight. But today the accident is the reason why the Luftwaffe does not practise formation aerobatics. The idea of setting up an aerobatics Schwarm with the WS 104 was born in September 1961 on the occasion of the Luftwaffe's five-year anniversary at Fürstenfeldbruck. There, the combat-like flying and the spectacle of four Starfighters breaking the sound barrier at an altitude of 16,000 metres led in the following months to routine flight operations in Nörvenich comprising two, three ship formations working their way more and more towards a four ship formation, which finally demonstrated aerobatics with the F-104. These figures were mainly flown horizontally and the (critical) vertical maneuvers for the F-104 were omitted.
Below; JBG 31 F-104 at IAT 1977
The 'Hundert vier' Starfighter in Luftwaffe service quickly acquired an appalling reputation - there were a large number of accidents, many of them resulting in fatalities. Intensive flying operations with the Starfighter did not start in Germany until 1961, when only two crashes took place. There were seven crashes in 1962, 12 in 1964, and 28 in 1965, or more than two a month. 1965 was the 'blackest' year for the German Starfighter programme - 26 million D-Mark of machines smashed into the ground, 17 pilots dead. By mid-1966, 61 German Starfighters had crashed, with a loss of 35 pilots. One pilot killed was the son of a former Defence Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. Joachim von Hassel was the 57th German Starfighter pilot death when he crashed in 1970. ('Mein Mann war Nummer 57') At the height of the crisis, the Starfighter accident rate peaked at 139 per 100,000 flying hours. As a result, the German press went into a feeding frenzy and the F-104 G was given derogatory nicknames such as "Witwenmacher" -'widowmaker' - " Der Sarg mit dem Balkenkreuz" - " the Coffin with the Maltese Cross" - or even the "Sargfighter". In total 116 Bundesluftwaffe pilots lost their lives in Starfighter crashes. At the height of the Starfighter political crisis in mid-1966, the Luftwaffe chief, Luftwaffeninspekteur General Werner Panitzki, Kammhuber's successor, was forced to resign after he had criticized the Federal Republic's Starfighter procurement program as being politically-motivated. His successor was the World War 2 ace Lieutenant General Johannes Steinhoff, who had flown Me 262 jets during the war. Steinhoff had not initially been a Starfighter supporter, and he had complained about the Bonn Defence Ministry's failure to implement the recommendations of his 1964 report on F-104 G survival measures. One of Steinhoff's first moves was to review the F-104 G's ejection system to enhance the probability of a successful escape by a pilot at low level. The Lockheed C-2 ejection seat initially fitted to the F-104 G had been fitted with a more powerful Talley Corp 10100 rocket booster by November 1966 to give it true zero-zero capability. However, it was found that the Talley rockets had a destabilizing effect after ejection, and had to be removed. After the German Starfighter had to be grounded once again for fixes to the C-2 seats in December of 1966, it was decided to switch over to Martin-Baker Mk GQ7A zero-zero ejection seats. A contract was signed on March 8, 1967 to re-equip the entire German F-104 G force with the Martin-Baker seats. This took about a year to get done. The first successful use of a GQ7 seat to escape from a German F-104 G took place during a ground-level overshoot at Ramstein on 24 September 1968.
Part 1 of a five-part German documentary 'Die F-104 G Starfighter Affäre'
" ...Walter Krupinksi, former JG 52 fighter ace and JV 44 Me 262 jet pilot went to the US at the request of Defence Minister Strauss to trial the Starfighter although he was no test pilot. He wrote an enthusiastic report about the type and presented it to Luftwaffeninspekteur Kammhuber ..."
" ...the Lockheed lobbyists - the firm was threatened with bankruptcy at the time - set up their HQ in the Koenigshof hotel in Bonn and undertook a month long tour through Germany in an attempt to clinch the deal - advertisements appeared in the German press for the type on a daily basis as if a new brand of washing powder was being sold.. .."
"..With the 'Super' Starfighter contract, the Federal Republic of Germany ordered Lockheed to develop an all-weather multi-purpose aircraft -from the existing F 104 A day fighter- at German expense, namely the F 104 G, with which three roles would have to be filled: that of the interceptor, the reconnaissance aircraft and the fighter bomber, which in an emergency would be used for a nuclear strike against targets beyond the Iron Curtain. Effectively the Federal Republic was buying a machine that did not exist..." (Der Spiegel 24/1962)
" By the spring of 1962 the time had arrived. At the Nörvenich Air Force Base the first squadron was equipped with the Starfighter. Strauss and Kammhuber wanted to present the aircraft to the public with great fanfare.
interviewee Günther Rall (faded in)
"... and Kammhuber said: "Let's go outside, see the practise display." And then he said: " the Waffenschule has an aerobatics team."
Rall: "What do you have ? An aerobatics team ? ... (Shaking his head, smiling ironically) ... But you know that ... Kammhuber wanted to fly along, two-seater ... I said: "Well, General, enough!"
Commentator : "...Kammhuber's secretly ordered aerobatics display goes terribly wrong. One day before the celebration the squadron crashes during a training flight. The American pilot Speer, the leader of the formation, makes a mistake. The other three pilots follow him to their deaths. The celebrations in Nörvenich are cancelled. Instead Strauss has to attend the funeral service of the dead pilots. An enormous embarrassment, he had mocked the critics only a few weeks previously. .." Strauss's speech faded in (underlaid with pictures of the funeral ceremonies):
"... and as far as the formation of the F-104 squadrons is concerned, you will receive the invitation to be personally present at the formation of the first full squadron of the F-104 G in Nörvenich on 20 June..."
Trailer for the RTL German TV dramatisation of the "Starfighter Affäre"
" With a 20,000 hp jet engine in his back Lieutenant Peter Kmonitzek in his Starfighter fighter bomber "F - 104 G" chased through the dark evening sky. It was a training flight, altitude: 9000 meters.
Suddenly, exactly eleven minutes after take-off, the lieutenant felt a choking feeling and nausea. His arms and legs began to twitch.
Hastily Kmonitzek, one of the best qualified Starfighter pilots in the Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) reached to the right for the control switch of the oxygen system and increased the supply from 60 to 100 percent. Nevertheless, nausea and limb twitching did not subside .Kmonitzek pushed the stick forward and let the machine swing down. His left hand clasped the catapult grip of the ejection seat. Lieutenant Kmonitzek tore the oxygen mask off his face at an altitude of 5000 metres. He looked into the rear-view mirror: his lips were white.
Kmonitzek aborted the flight. After his landing the security officer of the squadron said: "It could have been his death". The lieutenant came for medical treatment to the Aeromedical Institute in Fürstenfeldbruck.
Eight days before, on 6 December last year (1965) at 17:09, one of Kmonitzek's comrades, the 33-year-old Starfighter pilot and squadron captain Major Klaus Heinrich Lehnert, had also taken off from Nörvenich for a training flight. Eleven minutes later, over the Dortmund beacon, Lehnert answered for the last time with the call sign of his aircraft via voice radio: "Delta Alpha 254 . ." Then, in the middle of the sentence, the radio contact broke off. Pilotless - Major Lehnert slumped over in his pilot's seat - the atomic bomber raced northwards at an altitude of 9000 metres, almost at the speed of sound. Two hours and 33 minutes after take-off, the tanks were empty. The plane crashed on a rocky cliff outcrop near Ankenes, seven kilometres south of Narvik.
One of the possible causes of the Lehnert accident: traces of toxic gases in the airstream of the oxygen system, the reason for the premature landing of the Starfighter pilot Kmonitzek: fear of poison in the oxygen.
The fatal crash of Major Lehnert and the emergency landing of his comrade Kmonitzek cast a shadow on the year's end - the tenth year in the history of the Bundeswehr.
It was supposed to be a year of accomplishment for the flying arm of the Federal German armed forces. Five years earlier, when a Starfighter was demonstrated for the first time in Germany on the occasion of the Hanover Air Show, the-then Air Force Inspector General Josef Kammhuber had predicted that the German Starfighter air fleet would be complete and ready for battle by the end of 1965. The new German air force would then "belong to the best-equipped air forces in the world ".
" there is no end to the Starfighter Crisis. On page 23 of this issue of 'Der SPIEGEL' you can read, how one winter evening out of 52 aircraft of the Jabo-Geschwader Memmingen only eleven were serviceable but by the next morning only six machines were able to fly; how at the fighter squadron Wittmundhaven one training 'Rotte' went unserviceable while two replacement machines - declared startklar - were also unable to get airborne.. There will be no end to this 'crisis' so long as this aircraft remains in service and Hans Schmelz is SPIEGEL editor..."
"... The news of crash upon crash from Germany's Starfighter fleet has made headlines and filled obituary columns. Bad jokes like "widow maker", "flying coffin" and "beautiful death" (as US pilots had already christened the Starfighter years ago) reappeared in banner headlines. The Hamburg "Welt" called it the "Starfighter tragedy" at the end of December and added: "The run of accidents has become a matter of public concern. It belongs before the parliament." Already one year ago, on 20 January 1965, the Starfighter program of the German Armed Forces was the subject of a furious, albeit irrelevant, Bundestag session. The central theme of the debate on military maladministration: massive accusations by SPD member of parliament Karl Wienand, who had denounced the Starfighter program (among other armament projects) as a "huge waste".
Now, on Wednesday the week before last, the people's representatives again consulted about the Starfighter affair - this time in a small, secretive circle. Behind the locked doors of Bundeshaussaal 117 A, surrounded by steel cabinets filled with secret files, the 31 members of the defense committee met with a pack of officers and officials from the Federal Ministry of Defense to get an answer to a small request from the SPD.
The Bundeswehr's most expensive weapon system, according to the dreams of the strategists "spearhead of German air defense" ("FAZ") and "most powerful force within NATO" ("Interavia"), has turned out to be a disastrous planning bankruptcy. West Germany's taxpayers have so far spent at least eight billion marks on the acquisition and maintenance of the Starfighter fleet - as much as the Americans spent on the construction of the first atomic bomb.
For this the Germans have purchased an air force, which (according to the judgement of the SPD delegate Wienand) is at best "conditionally operational". Germany's Starlighter squadrons would, measured by the current crash rate, have shrunk by about a quarter of their stock by the beginning of the seventies, are of limited use for one of their planned operational tasks according to NATO planning as interceptors against enemy atomic bombers - in bad weather, are only imperfectly able to navigate their strategic mission - the nuclear strike in a Soviet attack.
Now, four years after the handover of the first Starfighter aircraft to the Luftwaffe, the scale and causes of the Starfighter debacle become visible.
The frightening losses of planes and pilots - described by General Johannes Steinhoff with the pithy word "blood duty" - and last but not least the fact that for the Starfighter program, independent of the losses by crashes, so far about 750 million marks avoidable additional costs have been incurred, are the consequence of an unprecedented overestimation by German armament planners.
In a touch of military-political craving for great power and in the determination to participate on the nuclear stage with the Western powers, the Bundeswehr, with a lack of expertise and in a hurry, imposed a technically extremely complicated weapon system - on a scale that far overtaxed the technical and personnel capabilities of the still young Luftwaffe. The pilot who controls the single-seat aircraft is stretched to the limit of human capability. When he climbs the cockpit via the eight-step stepladder and settles down with his shoulders, stomach and legs tied to the ejection seat - behind the control stick - he is, as it were, surrounded by electronic equipment. The Starfighter contains such a variety of measuring, calculating, display and operating systems that only a few years ago they were scarcely found in large bombers with a large crew..."
Left; cover image 'Der Spiegel - 5/1966" and, below, interview with Luftwaffeninspekteur Generalleutnant WernerPanitzski
( translations of the Spiegel article and interview by this blog author)
Der Spiegel " General, the public are saying that the series of crashes of the Starfighter last year was "catastrophic". How do you assess the accident situation?
Panitzski " In 1965 the Luftwaffe recorded an increase in aircraft accidents with the "F-104 G", as a result of which the attention and interest of the public was naturally concentrated on the "F-104". However, the accident curve does not differ significantly from the development of aircraft accidents in the weapon systems introduced in the Air Force before the "F-104".
Der Spiegel " How do you explain the frequent accidents last year? "
Panitzski " The increase in the "F-104" accident rate is not the result of one or other principal failure or error, but, as we discovered during the detailed investigations, it was the combination of errors, deficiencies and inadequacies in a wide variety of areas that led to the emergence of this catastrophe. From the catastrophic situation you also cited. There can therefore be no question of an accident 'situation', even though every single accident worries me. Air accidents cannot, however, be avoided by any measure, however conscientious it may be. Even in road transport - if you will allow me to make this comparison - accidents will not be ruled out by daily instructions for drivers or by improving driving safety in technology and people. We will not, however, be slackening in our efforts to identify and eliminate the causes of accidents..."
Der Spiegel ".. What are the reasons why the relatively young Luftwaffe maintains such a complicated weapon system as the Starfighter in such large numbers? "
Panitzski ".. Let me remind you that, for various reasons, the Air Force's original equipment consisted of subsonic weapon systems which had already been phased out by the US Air Force. When selecting a new system at the time, we did not opt for the next generation in the technical sense, but for the one after next. This makes it possible to keep the new weapon system in service for many years. The costs are spread over a longer period of time than with a less modern system, which would soon have to be replaced again. Production also becomes more economical for larger quantities. At the same time the possibility arose to bridge the twelve-year break from 1945 to 1957 and to catch up with the air forces of our NATO partners.."
Der Spiegel " There is no doubt that there are many difficulties in the Air Force in overcoming the Starfighter problem. Where do these problems come from? How will you solve them? "
Panitzski ".. The Luftwaffe was of course aware that this leap in development would cause some problems. The difficulties you mentioned, however, are not just problems specific to the Starfighter. The Bundeswehr, not just the Luftwaffe, lacks a high percentage of longer-serving personnel which, from the point of view of length of service alone, would make it possible to obtain the time-consuming special training to become an "F-104" technician. I have just proposed a number of possible measures to the Defence Committee in the personnel sector, which I hope will improve the personnel situation. Whether the proposed measures will be sufficient depends on many factors, including the future development of the situation in the German labour market, and cannot, of course, be predicted. The second difficulty lies in the technical deficiencies which have been discovered both in the course of aircraft accident investigations and during maintenance and repair work and which have repeatedly prompted the German Air Force to block the "F-104" from flying for safety reasons until all aircraft have been inspected and the deficiencies rectified. Of course, these difficulties also exist with other air forces and other types of aircraft, but this problem hits the young German air force particularly hard because it has a dual effect: technical deficiencies can endanger flight safety on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a high percentage of flight hours is lost in the event of closures, which in turn is lacking in order to provide pilots with flying experience. Of course, changes will never be avoidable. In future, however, they will be limited to those which improve flight safety and which are absolutely necessary for tactical reasons..."
Der Spiegel: " General, you mentioned the personnel problem. How do you explain the fact that there are too few candidates for pilot duty?.."
Panitzski " I don't think there is a causal connection between the increasing number of aircraft accidents and this. Rather, I see the main reasons for this in the diversity of opportunities offered to a young person in the age of economic prosperity in all professions..."
Geschwaderkommodore of JG 71 and former JG 51 ace Günther Josten was one commander who did not doubt the qualities of the F-104. But the widespread view that the procurement of the F-104 had not been done the right way, that the aircraft was unreliable, its electronic equipment unsuitable, all the facts and half-truths, right and wrong conclusions that were flying around rather blocked the determined management of the crisis, because they strengthened the already overpowering 'siege mentality' in both the political and military leadership of the Bundeswehr. On 27 January 1966 Josten took the dramatic step of requesting that his squadron be taken completely out of NATO subordination since the maintenance of an 'Alarmrotte' - the permanent readiness of machines to be scrambled against the Russian threat - prevented JG 71 from attaining the necessary and required flight hours. For reasons of flight safety, live firing training over the sea had already been stopped. In addition weather minima had to be increased for flight operations, since his pilots did not have enough experience and could hardly gain more. Günther Josten was not interested in confrontation. He was more interested in training more intensely than it was possible to do. He needed more time to manage and master the weapons and electronic systems - from the technical, logistical and infrastructure standpoints. On 31 January 1966 Josten was met by the commanding General of Luftwaffengruppe Nord, Gen. Lt. Werner Eugen Hoffmann - waiting unannounced in the Stabs building in Wittmund - who had arrived to participate in the pilots pre-sortie briefings. Hoffmann wanted to know how many flying personnel JG 71 had lost since its formation. - How many ? Thirteen: "That's not so bad," Hoffmann replied angrily according to Josten's notes - "other units have lost far more... " Now 'Der Spiegel' magazine's reporting was also used against him: "How were the pictures in the latest Starfighter articles taken? " And how was the magazine able to write in its issue 7/1966 that in Wittmund recently a training Rotte from " Jagdgeschwader Wittmundhaven " could not get airborne because of technical problems with the two assigned machines nor was it able to take off with the two replacement aircraft? * (*a telephone conversation with a press officer in Bonn was partly overheard by a Spiegel editor who was present at the time, but the circumstances of the actual chain of events had been misrepresented in the magazine..) Josten enlightened him: Weather and serviceability issues had prevented himself and Hptm. Pötter, the Kapitän of 711. Staffel from flying the sortie. " The accusations of the commanding General were so serious that I was gave real thought to relinquishing my post as Geschwader Kommodore.."
-Based on Günther Josten's 'Gefechtsbericht' (296 Verlag)
-Der Spiegel article on the Nörvenich crash " Death in the Afternoon " in issue 26/1962 here
-interview with ex-Starfighter pilot Wulf Beeck published in Bild newspaper to coincide with the broadcast of RTL's TV film production 'Starfighter - sie wollten den Himmel erobern ' in 2015 here (German text)
"We wanted to inform you that there was an incident on the 10th July 2012 at Kemble (Cotswold Airport, UK) concerning Tony (De Bruyn) and the Bronco. At approx. 15:00 in good flying conditions, Tony choose to take the opportunity to practise a standard display program. Unfortunately, shortly into the flight there was a problem and Tony and the Bronco had a crash landing from low altitude into the grass strip in front of the control tower.
The Bronco was destroyed on impact, but Tony managed to open the cockpit himself and was helped out by the fire crew. He was talking and moving all limbs and taken by helicopter to Franchay hospital in Bristol. He is presently in a stable condition with some burns and back injuries. Following on from his initial assessment he has subsequently had a successful operation on his back injury and is receiving treatment for his burns.
All the signs are for a positive full recovery; we will keep you updated.
Hereby we would like to thank the fire, rescue and hospital services for their professional assistance and care. Thank you to everyone for your help, support and kind wishes at this time.."
A small selection of new photos of the Red Arrows displaying at Koksidje Belgium in July this year - one of the best displays I've ever seen them put on. A small tribute to Flt Lt Jon Egging - Red 4 - who died when his Hawk T1 aircraft crashed near Bournemouth Airport after a display on Saturday 20 August. Pics by Nico Charpentier
Mid-air between the Skyraider and the P-51 'Big Beautiful Doll' during the mass fly-by and break at the end of the show. No casualties aside from the aircraft. The P-51 crashed (pilot Rob Davies parachuted clear) and the Skyraider landed safely minus a chunk of the starboard wing. View a video clip of the incident at the following link. The report below is from the Cambridge News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-14101641
Thanks to all the photographers..the pic of Rob baling out from BBD was seen on the sukhoi.ru forum but looks similar to an image from the sequence taken by gundylunch and posted on britmodeller.com. No doubt plenty of lenses were trained on that. The britmodeller sequence is by far the best of the incident.
Interviewed on the BBC's South East Today P-51 pilot Rob Davies said;
" ..it was an extremely loud impact which I heard even above the noise of the engine and the head-set.....the aircraft was violently thrown onto its side. At this point professionalism kicks in....even when its to save your life in this instance...normally if there's a problem you wouldn't bail out below 1,000 feet.."
..and the best video footage of the incident courtesy of David Taylor. A single click to view
Duxford Imperial War Museum was hosting its annual and hugely popular Flying Legends event yesterday (Sunday) when the mid-air collision happened.It is thought the crash involved two planes, one being a P-51 Mustang and the other a Skyraider.The pilot of the P-51 parachuted to safety and the pilot of the other plane was uninjured, managing to land his heavily damaged plane.
David Quinton, from Woodhurst, who shot the collision footage (stills above), said he was watching the display from a field in Thriplow and recording the planes with an HD camcorder. "We didn't realise what had happened at first," he said. "We were just hoping everyone was ok. Because it was so low we didn't know if the parachute would open." Mark Brown, 38, said: “As soon as I saw the two aircraft they were getting closer and closer together. The whole point of when they peel off one after the other, they aim to put a separation, a few hundred yards between them, they got that wrong, they came very close together. When the collision occurred, you know when you talk about things in slow motion, I thought that’s not right, they are far too close, they should not be doing that. As soon as I saw part of the wing tip coming off, I knew right from that instant there was going to be a serious problem.”
Another eyewitness said: “The P-51 is the aircraft that has crashed with the pilot managing to leave the aircraft and parachute to safety with the plane coming down on the perimeter of the airfield out of sight of the crowd. The Skyraider managed to make an emergency landing with a large portion of the starboard wing missing. An announcement later from the tannoy informed everyone that the pilot of the crashed plane had landed safely and walked to the ambulance.”
