Agility or Speed in modern jet fighters?
(translation by FalkeEins 'Jet and Prop' from the May 1965 issue of the German fighter pilots association magazine Jägerblatt)
".. Reports from Vietnam indicate that the first aerial engagements have taken place between supersonic U.S. fighter-bombers and significantly slower, Soviet-designed jet aircraft. Surprisingly, the advantage lay with the slower but more agile Soviet MiG-15 or MiG-17 jets. Several American F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers—capable of reaching roughly twice the speed of sound—were shot down by these Soviet-made fighters, which were reportedly flown by North Vietnamese crews.
What can be gleaned from this report? Can any lessons for Western air armament be drawn from this experience? The Soviet MiG-15 jet fighters were supplied to the Red Army as early as 1949–1952. They are relatively small aircraft that made headlines in the global press during the Korean War—much like the successes of the Me 109 at the Zurich air show in the 1930s, before the Second World War.
We may recall that the U.S. once offered a reward of over $100,000 for the delivery of a MiG-15, hoping to uncover the secrets of the aircraft. A Polish pilot eventually defected, flying a MiG-15 from Poland to Sweden. He landed on the island of Bornholm and, according to press reports at the time, received a substantial reward for his daring exploit.
It is also well known that the landing on the Baltic Sea island was, in itself, a sensational event; the island lacked any major airport—on the scale of Moscow-Tushino—as well as the concrete runways found at airports like Frankfurt (Rhein-Main) or Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel. Consequently, the MiG-15 must have been a jet aircraft capable of landing—and almost certainly taking off—from small airfields, or "field airstrips."
( blog note; on March 5, 1953, Polish Air Force 2nd Lt. Franciszek Jarecki defected and landed an undamaged, top-secret MiG-15bis jet fighter at Rønne Airport on the Danish island of Bornholm, asking for political asylum. 22-year-old Jarecki flew from Słupsk airbase in Poland during a routine training mission and broke formation to fly across the Baltic Sea.
This event marked the first time Western and NATO military intelligence agencies including American and British experts could examine an intact, fully operational Soviet-built MiG-15bis.
Following international protocols, the aircraft was crated and returned to Poland a few weeks later on March 20, 1953, while Jarecki remained in the West.
A similar defection to Bornholm by another Polish pilot flying a MiG-15 occurred later on September 25, 1956)
It is a proven fact that the significantly improved MiG-21 was specifically designed to take off from and land on grass runways. This raises the question of whether anything similar exists—or is at least being planned—within Western military aviation.
The MiG-17, a further development of the MiG-15 with which Soviet units were equipped starting in 1953, is considerably larger and weighs approximately 1,000 kg more. This model was also supplied by the Soviets to North Vietnam and other satellite states.
Furthermore, we recall that the F-86 Sabre served as the primary counterpart to the MiG-15 during the Korean War. According to the latest
information from a military correspondent for a
U.S. publication,
the ratio during the Korean War was
twelve MiG-15s lost for every one F-86 Sabre
shot down in aerial combat.
We are currently unable to verify this report, and it says nothing about the inherent quality of the MiG-15. It is far more likely that the United States had many highly experienced fighter pilots in Korea—men who undoubtedly understood their craft better than the North Korean MiG pilots did.
From the Second World War, we know that skilled pilots in slower aircraft often shot down less capable pilots flying superior, faster machines. When these slower aircraft also possessed significantly greater maneuverability, this factor alone could prove decisive. For instance, it was not uncommon for the Russian Polikarpov I-16 "Rata" to shoot down a Messerschmitt Bf 109—provided the German pilot failed to effectively exploit his own speed advantage.
The trade-off between speed and maneuverability was already a reality during the First World War. Manfred von Richthofen knew how to fully leverage the agility of his Fokker Dr.I triplane; he was careful to avoid using this particular aircraft for high-speed, diving attacks. Had he done so, he might have suffered the same fate as Gontermann, whose otherwise robust Fokker disintegrated in mid-air when he attempted to intercept a target during a dive rather than engaging in a turn.
But what is the situation today? Can an aircraft’s maneuverability still be a significant advantage—perhaps even more so now than in the past? Consider an incident where four F-105s—capable of speeds exceeding 2,500 km/h—were caught off guard at an operational altitude (cited by Washington as 500 meters) by MiG-15 fighters; the latter were more maneuverable, yet only half as fast. The F-105s were circling their target—presumably not flying at full throttle—when it happened. But what good is a top speed of 2,500 km/h if, upon reaching the target, one is forced—or simply chooses—to throttle back? What is the use of onboard radar and long-range radar if no timely warning is provided, and a MiG-15—using its onboard cannon—is able to shoot down an F-105, an aircraft that is far faster and more capable?
One could even conclude that there is such a thing as a 'tactical speed limit'..
Does the over-engineered, fully automated F-105 still retain any significant tactical value if it is forced to fly at reduced power while over enemy territory? Or was this circling perhaps necessary to divert or neutralize surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses?
Furthermore, one must ask whether modern air armaments are lacking an agile, simple, and lightweight aircraft—one capable of outmaneuvering incoming missiles. Which type of fighter today truly dominates the 0–8,000-meter altitude range? Did the British make a critical error by abandoning the further development of the Folland GNAT—a lightweight, agile, and inexpensive aircraft?
Is there any supersonic fighter in the West today capable of operating from improvised, unpaved airfields should concrete runways be destroyed by missile strikes? And are vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft not far too heavy—and their onboard electronics and automation systems too vulnerable to combat damage—to effectively evade anti-aircraft missiles?
Both Steinhoff and Mano Ziegler drew attention to the GNAT —a brilliant achievement by the British aviation industry, measuring just 6.60 meters in wingspan and 9.50 meters in length—during the 1956–1960 period. (For comparison, the Me 109 F had a wingspan of 9.60 meters and a length of 9.00 metres) The British military writer Roy Cross also frequently sang the praises of the Folland Gnat in his various publications. The Second World War had already demonstrated that sophisticated, automated weapons systems are inherently fragile. Moreover, missiles are invariably faster than even the most advanced jet fighters of our time. Wouldn't maneuverability help here—perhaps by allowing the aircraft to outsmart radar-guided and infrared-seeking missiles? No missile in the world would be able to keep up with a highly agile fighter jet, whether at low altitudes or near the ground.
A comparison of this table reveals that both the Fokker triplane (1917) and the Rata (1941) were the lightest—and therefore the most maneuverable—aircraft. Even the standard Japanese fighter, the Mitsubishi "Zero," weighed only slightly more than the Rata at 1,800 kg; while also highly maneuverable, it was significantly faster than the Rata. The most dramatic weight differences, however, are found among post-war jet aircraft. The F-104 Starfighter—not included in this table, but flown by pilots of our own *Bundeswehr*—weighs over 6,300 kg, more than double the weight of the Gnat. The Gnat, which was ordered from England by India, Finland, and Yugoslavia, weighs nearly 1,000 kg less than the MiG-15—an aircraft that was already relatively lightweight.
Our own Me 262 also fares quite well in these comparisons. Despite having two jet engines, it is only 300 kg heavier than the MiG-15, even though it was built 10 years earlier. If, on the other hand, one considers the weight of the F-105, one can...
understand that this aircraft, with its weight of 12,500 kg (in our comparison, we are always referring to the empty weight), cannot be very maneuverable; at low altitudes, it became easy prey for the MiG-15.
In issue No. 14 of the Hamburg weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*—which, incidentally, is also printed in Toronto and Buenos Aires—Peter Stähle criticizes the high expenditures for specialized equipment in the German Starfighter F-104G. He takes particular issue with the Starfighter’s LN-3 inertial navigation system. Regarding the funding for the costs of modifying this equipment, he cites details from the minutes of a key NASMO conference (attended by nations that purchased Starfighters equipped with the LN-3 system from the United States). While we certainly grant the citizens of our democracy the right to openly criticize government spending, such highly detailed matters should not be discussed in a public forum. We ought not to make things too easy for Russian intelligence.
It seems essential to us that the quality and performance of the "F-104G weapons system" (as General Panitzki terms it in his elegant response in *Die Zeit*) be continuously monitored. The fact is that the Litton unit has already been subjected to review, and efforts are underway to improve it, should such improvements prove necessary. It is gratifying to note that Colonel Rall and First Lieutenant Barakling are able to reach their targets in the Starfighter even when the inertial navigation system fails. However, this support provided by these two experienced pilots to their Inspector should by no means lead to the abandonment of further evaluations of the equipment.
The report above demonstrates that there is still a great deal in a state of flux within the realm of aerial armament.
In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to an attractive new development by German engineers—if only to demonstrate that those from the "old guard" still take a keen interest in developments within the Bundeswehr. Based on designs by Prof. Messerschmitt, a supersonic fighter has been built in Egypt; according to foreign press reports, it is the lightest jet fighter in the world. The HA 300 is said to possess excellent flight characteristics, with its maneuverability, in particular, being highly praised. It strikes us that this new Messerschmitt fighter bears a strong resemblance to the Folland Gnat. We find it especially regrettable, however, that it is being built in Egypt by German engineers rather than in Germany itself... "
by Dr. Steinicke
